Contempt of Court in India

In common law jurisdictions, contempt of court has traditionally been classified as either in facie curiae (in front of the court) or ex facie curiae(outside the court), or as criminal or civil.

The Sub Judice Rule
The term sub judice is derived from the Latin phrase adhuc sub judice li est, which means “the matter is still under consideration”. In common law jurisdictions, perhaps the most significant role of contempt of court law is the application of the sub judice rule: no one should interfere with legal proceedings which are pending.
The rationale behind this rule was explained in the leading English case of Attorney-General v. Times Newspaper Ltd.( [1973] 2 All ER 54.) where Lord Diplock stated:
The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights and liabilities; secondly, that they should be able to rely upon obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against any party and whose decision will be based upon those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law; and thirdly, that, once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely upon there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.
( Ibid., p. 72.)
Public Interest Defence
In some common law jurisdictions, there is a limited public interest defence which balances the risk to the due administration of justice with the public interest in knowing about and discussing public affairs.
In Australia, Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd., Re Truth & Sportsman Ltd., (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 242; the court explained:
It is of extreme public interest that no conduct should be permitted which is likely to prevent a litigant in a Court of justice from having his case tried free from all matter of prejudice. But the administration of justice, important though it undoubtedly is, is not the only matter in which the public is vitally interested; and if in the course of the ventilation of a question of public concern matter is published which may prejudice a party in the conduct of a law suit, it does not follow that a contempt has been committed. The case may be one in which as between competing matters of public interest the possibility of prejudice to a litigant may be required to yield to other and superior considerations. The discussion of public affairs and the denunciation of public abuses, actual or supposed, cannot be required to be suspended merely because the discussion or the denunciation may, as an incidental but not intended by-product, cause some likelihood of prejudice to a person who happens at the time to be a litigant.
It is well settled that a person cannot be prevented by process of contempt from continuing to discuss publicly a matter which may fairly be regarded as one of public interest, by reason merely of the fact that the matter in question has become the subject of litigation, or that a person whose conduct is being publicly criticized has become a party to litigation either as plaintiff or as defendant, and whether in relation to the matter which is under discussion or with respect to some other matter.( Bread Manufacturers, Ibid., pp. 249-50.)
In the case of EMS Namboodivipad v. TN Nambiar, AIR 1970 SC.p. 215-16. the Chief Minister of Kerala made a public statement accusing judges of class bias:
Marx and Engels considered the judiciary an instrument of oppression and even today… it continues so…. Judges are guided and dominated by class hatred, class interests and class prejudices and where the evidence is balanced between a well dressed pot-bellied man and a poor ill-dressed and illiterate person the Judge instinctively favours the former.
The Supreme Court upheld his conviction for contempt of court, reasoning that “the likely effects of his words must be seen and they have clearly the effect of lowering the prestige of Judges and Courts in the eyes of the people.”( Ibid., p. 2024)
As a general rule, it is well-established in common law jurisdictions that reasoned or legitimate criticism of judges or courts is not contempt of court.
The High Court of Australia took a different approach in Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Willis, 1992) 177 CLR 1, 38. where it suggested that truth could be a defence if the comment was also for the public benefit:
[T]he revelation of truth—at all events when its revelation is for the public benefit —and the making of a fair criticism based on fact do not amount to a contempt of court though the truth revealed or the criticism made is such as to deprive the court of public confidence. Ibid., p. 39.
The Law Commission of Canada stated that truth should not be available as a defence on the basis that it may result in “guerrilla warfare” against the judiciary. Contempt of Court (1982), p.26.
In a modern Australian case Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Willis, 1992) 177 CLR 1, pp. 38-39. the High Court of Australia stated:
[A] public comment fairly made on judicial conduct that is truly disreputable (in the sense that it would impair the confidence of the public in the competence or integrity of the court) is for the public benefit.
  Supreme Court of India in the Indirect Tax Practitioners Association, Bangalore vs. R.K. Jain on August 13, 2010 the two-judge bench, comprising G.S. Singhvi and Asok Kumar Ganguly, held that the editorial R.K. Jain wrote in his magazine, Excise Law Times, was based on facts and so would not amount to contempt of court. It ordered Rs. 2 lakh in costs on the petitioner association, of which Rs. 1 lakh would go to Jain and the rest would be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee
The other judgment related to a charge of contempt of court against Union Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal. The matter arose out of his comments as a senior Supreme Court lawyer on judges published in a magazine brought out by the advocates of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1995. While dismissing the charge, the Supreme Court ruled that a fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment, which is a public document or a public act of a judge concerned with the administration of justice, would not constitute a contempt of court. In the judges' opinion, such fair criticism should be encouraged.
The bench comprising Justices J.M. Panchal and A.K. Patnaik said that a fair reading of Mr. Sibal's message to the souvenir showed that it did not scandalise or tend to scandalise the authority of any court.
J. V.R. Krishna Iyer, a legal luminary and great judge who leads the campaign against judicial intolerance of criticism, observed in a recent article (“Against abuse of the contempt power,” The Hindu, July 24, 2010): “When the Executive misuses its powers, the court can strike down its actions. When the Legislature commits excesses beyond the Constitution or otherwise defaults, the court can declare it void. When judges themselves are guilty of flaws, shortcomings or violations, public criticism is the only way the judges can be corrected.” He added tellingly: “The best answer to abuse of judges is not frequent or ferocious contempt-sentencing but fine performance.”